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Wershow: Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida--The Demand for a Viable Soluti

AD VALOREM ASSESSMENT IN FLORIDA - THE
DEMAND FOR A VIABLE SOLUTION*
JAMVS S. WrasHow**

Three years have elapsed since the publication of my latest article dealing with a British remedy to Florida's ad valorem assessment problems.
During this period the British system continued to improve in both efficiency
and equitable results, while Florida continually encountered problems in
this area. Attempts by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
Florida's government to deal with the problems have been far from successful.
Some of the difficulties have centered around the administrative procedures
in assessment cases, the standards for establishing a bona fide agricultural
operation, and the party or board that should classify or assess property.
This article focuses on the past and present problems in the Florida assessment structure and attempts to delineate a viable alternative to the present
procedure.

1968 CONSTITUTION: A CONFIRMTION AND CLARIFICATION OF LEGISLATnvE
AND JuDiciAL UTrERANCEs

Article X, section 1 of the Florida constitution of 1885 provided: "[T]he
legislature should provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation . . .and
shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property."
Potential conflict between the constitutional commands of uniform and equal
rate and just valuation and the legislature's provision for assessment of agricultural land on an acreage basis with regard only to agricultural use has
been resolved consistently in favor of agricultural classification. Under the
1968 constitution just valuation2 has been retained and uniform and equal
has been reworded as "uniform rate within each taxing unit,"3 which merely
specifies what had always been implicit in the assessment process. However,
the 1968 constitution also provides that "[a]gricultural land . . . may be
classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use."'
Clearly the constitutionality of "green-belting" is no more in issue.5 It is no
*The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Bruce H. Bokor in the
preparation of this article.
**B.A. 1933, LL.B., LL.M. 1939, Yale University; Member of the Gainesville, Florida, Bar.
Adjunct Professor of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Markham v. Blount, 175 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965); Lanier v. Overstreet, 175
So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965); Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
2. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, §4 (emphasis added). As a matter of constitutional interpretation, the framers appear to have adopted the Florida supreme court's interpretation of
"just value." Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81, 85-86 (Fla. 1965).
3. FxA. CoNsr. art. VII, §2 (emphasis added).

4. FLA. CONsr. art. VII, §4 (a).
5. See generally Wershow, Regional Valuation Boards-A British Answer to Ad
Valorem Assessment Problems in Florida, 21 U. Fi.. L. Rnv. 324 (1969); Wershow, Recent
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longer necessary to assume that if land is in fact being used for bona fide
agricultural purposes its just value is properly determined only by agricultural use factors. Under present article VIi, section 4 of the Florida
constitution there is no room left to argue about the definition of "just
value," nor about whether such classification of land is discriminatory.
It appears that the framers of the 1968 constitution also adopted the
Florida supreme court's construction of the constitutional mandate directing
the legislature to "prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation."
In Burns v. Butscher7 the Florida supreme court upheld the constitutionality
of the predecessor to present section 195.032 of the Florida Statutes, 8 which
authorized the state comptroller to promulgate standard measures of value
to be used by tax assessors. The statute created a presumption that such
standards were the criteria of just valuation contemplated by the constitution. 9 The statute also required assessors and boards of adjustment to follow
and apply these standards, the burden being upon the assessor or board
"refusing to follow such standard to overcome the presumption [of correctness]
by a preponderance of the evidence."1 °
In Burns it was argued that article VIII, section 6 of the 1885 constitution, providing for the election of county tax assessors, prohibited the imposition of such restrictions authorized by the legislature. Rejecting this
argument, the court said such unrestricted authority could not be inferred
and noted that the "[e]xercise of unbridled discretion by 67 Tax Assessors
without their being anchored to any master plan would result in the imbalance already so clearly indicated.":" Nevertheless, in Powell v. Kelly -2
the supreme court emphasized that real estate appraisal was an art rather
than a science, and that while the use of properly promulgated guidelines
may be mandatory their application called for discretion.' 3 The obligation
to apply such standards is, therefore, not an infringement upon the assessor's
status under article VIII of either the 1885 or the 1968 constitutions.
Statutory Changes
At the time of this author's latest article in this series's the legislature
had just enacted a compulsory "green belt" statute, section 193.201 of the
Developments in Ad Valorem Taxation, 20 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 1 (1967); Wershow, Ad Valorem
Assessments in Florida- Whither Now?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 9 (1965); Wershow, Ad Valorem
Taxation and Its Relationship to Agricultural Land Tax Problems in Florida, 16 U. FLA.
L. REv. 521 (1964); Wershow, Agricultural Zoning in Florida-Its Implications and Promlems, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 479 (1960).
6. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §4. "By general law regulations shall be prescribed which shall
secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation ... " Id.
7. 187 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1966).
8. FLA. STAT. §192.31 (1965). The present version places the duty to promulgate regulations in the Department of Revenue.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

FLA. STAT.

§195.032 (1971).

Id.
Burns v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1966).
223 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1969).
Id. at 309.
Wershow, Recent Developments in Ad Valorem Taxation, 20 U. FiA. L. Rxv. 1 (1967).
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Florida Statutes. This statute required each county to establish an agricultural

zoning board with the duty to "zone" lands as agricultural that were
"actually used for bona fide agricultural purpose." Once lands were so zoned,
the assessor could consider only the factors specified within section 193.201 in
appraising agricultural land. An earlier version of this statute, enacted in
1959, merely authorized the board of county commissioners "in its discretion
to zone areas in the county exclusively used for agricultural purposes as
agricultural lands."1 5 However, once lands were so zoned under either form
of the green belt statute, only such factors as were listed within section 193.201
were to be considered in assessing agricultural land.
The 1969 legislature renumbered the green belt law and made some minor
changes in the statute,8 the most significant being the reduction of the
county tax assessor from full membership on the agricultural zoning board
to the position of a non-voting ex officio member. Clearly, the purpose of
the act was to separate the zoning function for the assessing function. However, after reconsidering, the 1972 legislature abolished the agricultural zoning board.17 Under the amended statute the "assessor shall . .. classify for
assessment purposes all lands within the county as either agricultural or
non-agricultural."'" Yet once the assessor has made an agricultural determination he is directed to assess the land solely on the basis of agricultural use
and to consider only the use factors enumerated within the statute. The
present versions of section 193.461 of the Florida Statutes lists the following
"use" factors:
(1) the quantity and size of the property,
(2) the condition of said property,
(3) the present market value of said property as agricultural land,
(4) the income produced by said property,
(5) the productivity of the land in its present use,
(6) the economic merchantibility of the agricultural produce, and
(7) such other agricultural factors as may from time to time become
applicable.
These factors are substantially the same as those referred to in prior
forms of the statute. However, certain additions and deletions have been
made. Two factors omitted are the "present depreciated value of improvements" and the "character of the area or place in which said property is
located." A reason for omitting the former may be confusion over the meaning of "depreciated value." For example, although a barn or other structure
may have been depreciated to virtually zero for federal income tax purposes,
the present market value of the structure, even for use in agricultural operations, may be significantly higher. Concerning the latter omission, case law ful-

15. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 226, §1.

16. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 55, §§1, 2.
17. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 181, §1.

18. Id.
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ly substantiates the persuasive effect that increased value in the surrounding
residential or commercial market has had upon the determination of agricultural use and upon the initial request for agricultural classification. 19 If
such a factor is improper to consider with respect to whether the land in
question is being used for bona fide agricultural purposes than, a fortiori,
once land is classified as agricultural how can the character of the surrounding area be relevant to the value of the land for agricultural purposes?
Two factors added to section 193.461 are "the productivity of the land in
its present use" and "the economic merchantibility of the agricultural product." Little discussion is needed to delineate the relevance of these factors
to the value of any piece of land used for agricultural purposes.
The most significant change in the green belt law, however, is the legislature's attempt to define "bona fide agricultural purposes." The county tax
assessor, and formerly the agricultural zoning board, is directed to classify
20
lands as agricultural that are used for bona fide agricultural purposes.
Deceptively simple, this phrase has long cried for definition and has been
the source of much litigation. Case law has failed to provide sufficiently consistent guidelines to protect the farmer without providing a tax shelter for
the land speculator. However, a brief discussion of the courts' dilemma will
shed light on the 1972 legislature's attempt to define "bona fide agricultural
2
purposes." The statute provides:

1

"Bona fide agricultural purposes" mean "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." In determining whether the use of the land
for agricultural purposes is bona fide, the following factors may be
taken into consideration:
(1) the length of time the land has been so utilized,
(2) whether the use has been continuous,
(3) the purchase price paid,
(4) size as it relates to specific agricultural use,
(5) whether an indicated effort has been made to sufficiently and
adequately care for the land in accordance with accepted commercial
agricultural practices including without limitation fertilizing, liming,
tilling, mowing, and re-foresting and other accepted agricultural practices,
(6) whether such land is under lease and if so, the effective length
and terms and conditions of the lease, and
(7) such other factors as may from time to time become applicable.
19. E.g., Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971); Jeffreys v. Simpson, 222 So. 2d
224 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969). Under the new statute, where land is sold for three or more
times its agricultural assessment, a rebuttable presumption is created that such land is not
used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Thus, if the presumption is not overcome, the new owner cannot claim an agricultural classification and must pay taxes on
the higher assessed value. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 181, §1.
20. It should be mentioned that even where so classified such lands can be re-classified
as non-agricultural "when there is contiguous urban or metropolitan development and the
board of county commissioners finds that the continued use of such lands for agricultural
purposes will act as a deterrent to the . . . expansion of the community." Fla. Laws
1972, ch. 181, §1.
21. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 181, §1.
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These factors have in most instances been adopted through acceptance or
rejection of the various results of the cases in this area of law.
In Matheson v. Elcook22 the land had been used for over forty years as a
coconut plantation. Because of its strategic location in Dade County the
land was worth many times its agricultural use value. 23 Furthermore, the
coconut production upon the 67.89 acre tract could have been accomplished
on five acres. Nevertheless, the district court affirmed the chancellor's finding
that the land was used for a bona fide agricultural purpose even though it
was inefficiently operated and was losing money. The court reasoned:24
There is nothing in the law that requires a person to operate a business efficiently or at a profit. . . . [T]his result could cause many
situations of tax avoidance based on agricultural use of property, but
we hasten to point out that before the taxpayer can take advantage of
this statute he must demonstrate to the taxing authorities that his agricultural operation is bona fide, in good faith. In this case no one
questions the bona fides of appellants' agricultural operation.
Although the court in Matheson did not delineate any guiding factors
for determining "good faith," the opinion did weigh certain evidentiary
factors evident in the new green belt law. For example, in favor of the taxpayer were such circumstances as the length of time the land had been
utilized for agricultural purposes, the continuity of such use, and the fact
that the. whole tract had been used for coconut production. The inefficiency
of the operation was rejected as a probative factor. However, it must be
assumed that the product was picked and sold, since this would clearly reflect whether there was actually a bona fide agricultural operation.
In Walden v. Borden Co. 2r Borden leased a tract of land adjacent to its
phosphate operation to farmers for cattle pasturing. The lease provided for
a tenancy at will, terminable on sixty days' notice, and also reserved to
Borden an easement for the discharge of smoke, fumes, and other by-products
of the phosphate plant. The supreme court was not satisfied with the lower
courts' decision that the land was used "primarily" for bona fide agricultural
purposes under section 193.461 of the Florida Statutes. The court explained: 26
[he legislature did not intend to give preferential tax treatment to
land such as that in the instant case that was obviously purchased for
use in connection with the company s phosphate operations ... even
though it accommodates, also, an incidental use for agricultural purposes.
The Walden court, acknowledging its conclusion would not have been
different had the company used the land itself, clearly implied that the
22.
23.
valued
24.
25.

173 So. 2d 164 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1965).
Id. at 165. The court noted that the land was worth over $2,359,600; the assessor
it at $490,510 and the taxpayer claimed it should be assessed at $54,312.
Id. at 166.
285 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1970).

26. Id. at 802.
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agricultural use itself was determinative rather than analyzing whether an
27
owner or lessee conducted the agricultural operation.
28
In another leasing arrangement, Smith v. Ring, the land in question
was leased:

29

[T]o legitimate cattlemen who ran cattle on the property and followed
. . . acceptable agricultural practices . . . . [IThe entire tract was
fenced and fifty acres thereof cleared and planted to improve pasture .

. .

. The grazing lease . . . provided that the property could

be used only for agricultural purposes. During the year the pasture
was actually mowed and fertilized by the lessee and was being used at
its maximum capacity in the grazing of cattle in connection with a livestock raising enterprise.
A comparison of Smith and Walden clearly shows the relevancy of the
"lease factor" in determining good faith: Whether such land is under lease
and, if so, the effective length and terms and conditions of the lease. A tenancy
at will terminable upon sixty-days notice with an easement for the discharge
of the phosphate operation's by-products is certainly distinguishable from a
one-year lease without such an easement that expressly provides for agricultural use only. Of course the Smith case is illustrative of how good agricultural practices can affect the court's determination. The legislature also
considered this criterion relevant to the issue of good faith when it adopted
the "agricultural practices" factor in the new statute.30
In 1971 three contests concerning timber lands' were certified to the
Florida supreme court by the First District Court of Appeal. In St. Joe Paper
Co. v. Mickler32 the district court affirmed a conclusion of no bona fide
forestry operation that was based merely on the finding that certain good
forestry practices, land management and fire protection, were not followed.
The supreme court reversed, 33 basing its opinion in part on Judge Spector's
dissent in the lower appellate court opinions 34 that there is "no legal re-

27. Therefore, certain guidelines can be elicited from the Walden and Matheson
opinions, which can be considered in establishing the "bona fides" of an agricultural operation: (1) there is no requirement for efficient operation at a profit; (2) there is no require-

ment to devote the land to its highest and best use or to its highest and best agricultural
use; (8) the primary use of the land must be agricultural; (4) the use of the land by the
owner or his lessee is irrelevant to the application of the bona fide agricultural purpose

standard.
28. 250 So. 2d 918 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1971).
29. Id. at 914.
30.

Fla. Stat. §193.461 (1971), as amended, Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 181, §1.

81.

St. Joe Paper Co. v. Mickler, 241 So. 2d 415 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970), rev'd, 252 So.

2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Oates v. Bailey, 241 So. 2d 730 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom.,
Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971); Sapp v. Conrad, 240 So. 2d 884 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1970), afJ'd, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
82. 241 So. 2d 415 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).

88. 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
34. 241 So. 2d 415, 419 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
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quirement that a person following agricultural pursuits must do so by the
most modern and scientific methods available."
The Florida supreme court further emphasized this position in Conrad v.
Sapp,85 a case also involving forestry operations. In Conrad, since there had
been increased urbanization of the surrounding land, the tax assessor looked
to the land's location and conversion possibilities for future use in denying
the landowner an agricultural assessment. Although the landowner had not
adopted re-seeding or proper firelaning, the court found that these two
factors were not determinative of non-agricultural use. In upholding the
agricultural use classification the court quoted from the lower court's opinion: a6
"The decisive issue in this cause, of course, is what constitutes a bona
fide forestry operation. Is proof required that the landowner must embark upon a program of land preparation, planting of trees and cultisame ignore
as is requisite
in row
crop' farming?
Weinthink
To
vation
so
holdofwould
the history
of forestry
operations
this not.
country
from
thehold
timefor
ourthe
fathers
and of
forefathers
began
setting aside
plots
of
land to
purpose
periodically
harvesting
timber,
pulp
wood or naval stores. A bona fide forestry operation is not synonymous
with tree fanning."
A further attempt to reconcile the problem is found in Greenwood v.
Oates.37 In that case Justice Dekle made a commendable effort to define a
bona fide operation, incuding the delineation of several guidelines:3 8
land;
(1) the opinions of forestryo other appropriate experts;
(2)
Assessor's
applicable
opinion
and his
factual
data;
(3) the
the Tax
affidavit
and testimony
of expert
the landowner
witnesses;
an se and
(4) the business or occupation of the landowner;
(5) the nature of the terrain;
lan(6) the density of the marketable timber (or other product) on the
(7) the past usage of the land;
(8) reasonable
the economic
merchantability
of the agricultural
product;
(9)
attainable
economic salability
thereof within
a reasonable futur time for the particular product (trees do not mature and
become so rapidly salabie as do
ickens or cows); and
(10) the use or not of recognized care, cultivation, harvesting and
like practices applicable to the product involved, and any implemented
plans therefor.
These factors appear to have continued vitality under the new green belt
law in the determination of a bona fide agricultural purpose. To the extent
that such factors are considered "applicable," they may be considered by
the assessor in making his deteraination.m( However, as the above list of

35. 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
36. Id. at 227.
37.

251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971).

88.
668. 1972, ch.
39. Id.
Fa.atLaws
181. §1. In McKinney v. Hunt, 251 So. 2d 6 (1st D.CA. F~a.
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factors indicates, there is an unavoidable overlap of considerations with
respect to the classifications of agricultural land and its tax assessment. The
only criterion that should definitely not be weighed with regard to either
determination is the "highest and best use" to which such land may be put
based on its location. 40 Conversely, the general economic success of the land
is clearly relevant to both determinations. Yet it should be obvious from the
cases discussed above, this criterion should not be given too much weight in
the classification decision.
In summary, it appears that, regardless of the factors that may be listed
by the courts, the court may still find exception for land that is put to a real
agricultural use. Nevertheless, there is value in this case law. Mainly, these
decisions forbid the assessor to look at any given factor such as the occupation of the owner, the productivity of the farm, or the size of the farm and
then declare the land to be non-agricultural on that basis alone. However,
the cases seem to state that the owner may fail on several bases and still be
using the land for a bona fide agricultural purpose, which in an effort to
protect the real farmer leads the court back to a very subjective standard.
THE FAILURE OF ARBITRATION

To SOLVE

THE PROBLEM

In 1969 the Florida Legislature, cognizant of the many problems involved
in tax assessment, enacted an arbitration statute4 1 designed to give an aggrieved
taxpayer an additional, administrative proceeding to solve his plight. The
statute provided that any taxpayer who was dissatisfied with the action taken
by the board of tax adjustment could seek arbitration by giving notice to the
board within twenty days of the board decision. Along with the notice, the
taxpayer was required to name an arbitrator. The board then named its
arbitrator, and the two arbitrators selected a third to make up the arbitration panel. Assessment was decided upon by a majority of the panel. The
decision, which was final unless overturned by a court of competent jurisdiction, had to be in writing and had to include findings of fact.
The first case to deal fully with the arbitration statute was Sherry Frontenac, Inc. v. Tax Assessor.42 The case involved a corporation that challenged
its 1970 ad valorem tax assessment, appealed to the board of tax adjustment,
and later properly demanded arbitration. The corporation, dissatisfied with
the arbitration decision, appealed to the Dade circuit court for annulment
of the tax assessment. Although the court did not discuss the merits of the

1971), taxpayers in Alachua County owned 15 acres of land; 11 acres were improved
pasture, 25 acres were devoted to field crops; and 1.5 acres to the taxpayers' home site.
The owner had a non-agricultural, full-time job, and worked on his property only during
his free hours. Actually, a very small portion of the products of the land were used
commercially, most being consumed by the taxpayers' personal use. Nevertheless, the court
said "the use of the land rather than the occupation of the owner . . . is relevant, so long
as the land itself is used in good faith for agricultural purposes." Id. at 10.
40. See, e.g., Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1971).
41. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 140, §5 (repealed 1971).
42. 85 Fla. Supp. 140 (Cir. Ct. Dade County 1971).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/2

8

Wershow: Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida--The Demand for a Viable Soluti
19721

AD VALOREM ASSESSMENT IN FLORIDA

taxpayer's contentions, it did review the relationship between an arbitration
panel and a court on tax assessment matters.
The court rejected the tax assessor's argument that the Florida Arbitration Code43 was subject to judicial review except on grounds enumerated
in the Code."4 Citing the Florida constitution45 and Florida Statutes, section
194.171, to support a circuit court's "exclusive, original jurisdiction" in
property tax matters, the court held that the "operational effect contended
for §§194.033, 682.03 and 682.18 [could] not be sustained."'46 The court,
therefore, arguably held the arbitration statute invalid, since it removed
"exclusive, original jurisdiction" over tax matters from the circuit courts.
Irrespective of the court's decision on the validity of the arbitration
statute, the Florida Legislature repealed the statute in 1971.47 Presumably,
the main reason the legislature repealed the statute was that it failed to
accomplish its purpose adequately. The statute had enabled large corporations in small counties to seek arbitration and then use their power to coerce
the county into acquiescing for a smaller assessment figure. Just as the arbitration statute did not alleviate the problems in tax assessment, the current
practice is also fraught with pitfalls. Disputes under the present method
demonstrate that a new procedure is necessary.' 8
OBjEcYivS AND RECOMENDATONS

The unsuccessful attempts to solve the problems of ad vadorem taxation
exemplify the need to establish a workable procedural approach to valuation
and assessment. As noted in two of the earlier articles in this series,4 the
British practice of dealing with similar ad valorem taxation matters has not
only protected the rights of the taxpayer but also has provided the government with a correct basis for taxation. The need to rectify the inequities in
the present Florida assessment situation is further enforced by the recent
case of Serrano v. Priest."0 In that case certain taxpayers challenged the
California public school financing system, which was based primarily upon
ad valorem property taxation. The system allowed the governing body of
each city or county to levy taxes on the real property within a school district
at a rate necessary to meet the district's annual education budget. 51 The
amount of revenue that a'district could raise depended largely upon the
assessed valuation of real property within its border. The California supreme
court found that this method of financing violated the equal protection
EA.STAT. ch.682 (1971).
44. FLA. STAT. §682.13 (1971).

45.

CoNsr. art. V,§6 (3).
46. 85 Fa. Supp. at 142.
47. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 371, §5.
45. F.

48. See Wershow, Regional Valuation-A British Answer to Ad Valorem Assessment
Problems in Florida,21 U. F.A. L. REV. 824 (1969).
49. Id.; Wershow, Recent Developments in Ad Valorem Taxation, 20 U. FLAx.L. REV.

1, 14 (1967).
50. 5 CaL Sd 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 CaL Rptr. 601 (1971).

51. Id. at 592, 487 P.2d at 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
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clause of the United States Constitution. 5 2 The financing system was based
upon "wealth" and thus invidiously discriminated against poor districts with
a low tax base. For example, while Baldwin Park citizens paid twice as much
tax on each 100 dollars of assessed valuation as did the more affluent Beverly
Hills citizens, the Baldwin Park citizens were able to spend only half as
4
53
much on education. In striking down the funding method, the court noted:
In summary, so long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a major determinant of how much it can spend for its schools,
only a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide how
much it really cares about education. The poor district cannot freely
choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. For from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present
financing system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that
option.
Serrano may have initiated a trend5 5 that may eventually lead to the disappearance of many of the functions of local assessors 56 concerning land assessment.
A possible approach to ad valorem assessment that should be considered
by the Florida Legislature at its next session involves the reallocation of
Florida into eight or ten assessment regions. These regions would be grouped
according to their character of land development and not by their geographical location. In other words, counties with common attributes, such
as the counties in the Tampa Bay area, would be grouped together for
assessment purposes. In each region land values would be determined by
an assessment board consisting of an attorney, a real estate appraiser, and a
layman familiar with the land to be assessed. Since there would only be
eight or ten assessment boards rather than sixty-seven separate assessment
regions there would be greater uniformity in assessment for similar types
of land. Uniformity in valuation would be further strengthened by the fact
that the boards would be primarily concerned with land possessing like
characteristics. This would allow for like-kind property located in different
counties but in the same assessment region to be taxed equally and at
full value.

52. Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
53. Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
54. Id. at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
55. E.g., Rodriguez & San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
56. Although tax assessors were once considered "constitutional officers," article VIII,
§1 (d) of the 1968 constitution may have impliedly precluded assessors from this classification.
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CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, there must be a choice between retention of the
existing assessment procedures and a restructuring of the present practice to
meet the needs of the people of Florida and the constitutional doctrines
relating to fair taxation. The difficulties with the past and present methods
seem to forecast that a "change for the better" should be adopted as soon
as possible. It is, therefore, of tantamount importance that Florida adopt a
real property assessment procedure that is both operational and equitable.
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